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To the extent that phenomena and noumena are for Kant metaphysically and logically connected such an elaboration must, of course, be limited in its scope. The context referred to here is the context of judgment in accordance with the categories of the understanding—the lynchpin that is used to connect the sensible and rational aspects of the mind.


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The empirical question of how the mind knows is subordinated to the Kantian apriori principle of thinking, rather than in terms of its concrete characteristics or its conscious intentions. Kant does not seek to explore and describe this ego but instead seeks to explain and justify all intentions conceptually at an abstract level of reflection, i. For Husserl consciousness means or intends the world. The matrix of consciousness for Husserl has its own transcendental aesthetic of temporal structure in which the retentions of the past and the protensions of the future are integrated into a concrete presence of intentionality.

Ricoeur describes this as follows:. To distinguish signification from signs, to separate it from the word, from the image, and to elucidate the diverse ways in which an empty signification comes to be fulfilled by an intuitive presence, whatever it might be, is to describe signification phenomenologically….. Husserl points out that there are many different forms of intentionality in which a distinctive cogitatio is directed at a distinct cogitatum.

A thought, that is, might take the form of a willing or the forms of loving, desiring, judging something present past or future.

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A perceiving of an object appears, however, to be the primary form of intentionality for Husserl probably because it is the primary form of intentionality that constitutes consciousness. Another problem with Husserlian Phenomenology is that from the point of view of common sense it strains the imagination to be asked to believe that consciousness is capable of physical action. When Husser, however, claims that different forms of consciousness have different meanings in accordance with the different objects that are intended this obviously raises the question of truth and its relation to consciousness.

The former is obviously a bridge from the inner realm of the mind to the outer and the latter being an internal bridge between aspects of mentality that are not shared by the unselfconscious consciousness of animals.

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In the absence of such an object, it has no meaning and is completely lacking in content, though it may still contain the logical function which is required for making a concept out of any data that may be presented. Now the object cannot be given to a concept otherwise than in intuition: for though a pure intuition can indeed precede the object a priori even this intuition can acquire its object and therefore objective validity only through the empirical intuition of which it is the mere form—therefore all concepts, and with them all principles, even such as are possible apriori relate to empirical intuitions, that is to the data for a possible experience.

Apart from this relation, they have no objective validity and in respect of their representations are a mere play of imagination and the understanding. Even the concept of cause has intuitive relations with intuitive Time on pain of becoming meaningless, an empty abstract logical exercise. The rules of the employment of the understanding, then, are therefore not transcendent rules but rather rules that anticipate the forms of possible experience. Here we are obviously also touching upon the truth function of consciousness insofar as we are dealing with self-conscious beings.

Objects are subsumed under concepts in Judgments that are directed at the truth..

This, however, does not mean that the concepts arise out of the objects: concepts are nothing but forms of thought for Kant. There is, however, another aspect of Kantian thought which runs counter to the Husserlian Phenomenological project:. The question then arises whether our pure concepts of the understanding have meaning, in respect of these latter objects, and so can be a way of knowing them.

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They are an X, an unknown, situated at the boundary of our understanding and reasoning about the world. The above quote, then, points to Kantian links between consciousness and perception both inner and outer and between consciousness and its truth-functional relation to the world. Husserl, in particular, the mathematician and scientist would also reject the metaphysical and ontological commitments referred to above, even if they were made to determine the limits of our thought about the world.

The reduction of all of life to consciousness without any accompanying relation to truth and rationality would have been for Kant a resurrection of a kind of dualism that reminded one of Cartesian Philosophy and its need to eventually retreat into a materialistic position which located consciousness in the brain with an appeal to God thrown into the equation to maintain dualistic assumptions. No such materialistic component or reference to God is to be found in Husserl, of course, but a spiritualism of consciousness which we do find would have been a cause for concern for Kant who inherited the Aristotelian propensity to give an account of Being in his explanations and justifications of all forms of change to be found in this complex world.

Rationality and logic are replaced in the mature Husserl by a method that implies the use of the imagination to varying the presentation of phenomena in pursuit of their essences. There is also a shift from the question of why things are as they are to how they can be so: a shift away from the need for justification.

But ideas that comprise a sheer activity thinking belong to the intellectual cognitive faculty. The former is called the lower, the latter the higher cognitive faculty. The lower cognitive faculty has the character of passivity of the inner sense of sensations: the higher a spontaneity of apperception, that is of pure consciousness of the activity that constitutes thinking.

It belongs to logic a system of rules of the understanding , as the former belongs to Psychology a sum of all inner perceptions under laws of nature and establishes inner experience. The criticism of Psychology described by Kant above would follow for all forms of transcendental solipsism.

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The justification of this criticism would also point to the lack of attention to the truth-function of consciousness and its links to the activity of thinking entailed by the Categories of Judgment. Ricoeur, in giving his own account of the matter, fixates upon the reflection involved in self-consciousness, a form that is detached from the truth of representation:. Since this truth cannot be verified like a fact, nor deduced like a conclusion, it has to posit itself in reflection.

Such is our philosophical starting point. The above, according to Ricoeur, does not, however fully characterize the power of reflection which also requires an act of interpretation that in its turn requires philosophical positions as complex as Phenomenology or Psychoanalysis to complete. This is because consciousness cannot be captured in an intuition but rather requires:. Consciousness, in other words, is, as Freud maintained, a vicissitude of the Instincts, it is a task requiring a complicated hylomorphic actualization process.

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Such existential entities are, in Kantian language, intentions without intuitions. Now, this naive positing is precisely the omission of the connection of particular beings to ourselves and it arises from that Anmassung presumption of sensuousness discussed by Kant. One can also detect in the above quote a Kantian critique of a position that attempts to situate itself at the level of the lower cognitive functions operating at the level of the imagination rather than on the higher cognitive levels of the understanding and reason.

For Husserl, the mathematician and scientist Reason is connected to originary evidence, a position that claims that there is no intention without an intuition to provide evidence for it. This level was built up on the basis of ante-predicative existence and present consciousness: a thinking that is actually present here and now and certain of itself in its act and intention.

This cannot but end in the tears and tragedy of transcendental solipsism which immediately it is posed suggests the problem of the status of other consciousnesses. This possibility of experience is not a possibility for one consciousness but rather a principled universal possibility where I can both intend myself and others as beings, not on the basis of intuitions but on the basis of the possession of powers of understanding and reason.

In this reasoning-process, we encounter no intuition or feeling of empathy requiring an act of imagination, but rather an appeal to an attitude of Respect that is required by all beings that are persons because they are what they are. This formulation in its turn founds a third formulation of the categorical imperative which relates to persons living under the reign of justice and law: a realm in which their human rights are determined both by the moral law and a doctrine of rights that are a part of that moral system.

It is clear that for Ricoeur, intention without intuition is blind and therefore alien to my subjective life.

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At issue in this misunderstanding is the difference between a quaestio juris which relates to the normative right that exists to justify the application of an idea or a concept and a quaestio facti that relates to the evidence for a claim in the tribunal of experience, A transcendental deduction is needed to provide the justification or the right to use an idea or a concept. Insofar as the theoretical ideas of pure reason are concerned they are not constitutive whether they be psychological, cosmological, or theological. Kant has this to say concerning theoretical pure reason:.

There must, however, be some source of positive modes of knowledge which belong to the domain of pure reason, and which, it may be, give occasion to error solely owing to a misunderstanding, while yet in actual fact they form the goal towards which reason is directing its efforts. How else can we account for our extinguishable desire to find firm footing somewhere beyond the limits of experience? Reason has a presentiment of objects which posses a great interest for it. But when it follows the path of pure speculation, in order to approach them, they fly before it.

Presumably, it may look for better fortune in the only other path which still remains open to it, that of its practical employment. It is clear from the above that all attempts to gain knowledge about the object or phenomenon of man only ends in the Heideggerian position of Man as a being for whom his being is in question. Kant confirms this in the following comment:. Consequently, if there be any correct employment of pure reason, in which case there must be a canon of its employment, the canon will deal not with the speculative but with the practical employment of reason.

Reason will not be satisfied until it reaches out beyond the realm of its empirical employment to the limits of all knowledge and toward a self-subsistence systematic whole. The practical employment of reason is twofold, instrumental and categorical. In the case of instrumental reasoning, the use of reason is for the empirical purposes of our happiness and is governed by the regulative principle of prudence. In this realm, we do see and feel the influence of the principle or especially the absence of the principle. A priori categorical laws, on the other hand, are concerned with what we categorically ought to do as compared with what we prudentially and hypothetically ought to do in order to achieve individual happiness.

The freedom of the will is transcendentally practical when it is determined categorically by reason in its practical employment. The form of happiness on the other hand, that follows from a form of life that is lived by following the moral law is a more permanent form of happiness and it is this form that, according to Kant we all hope for. Morality is of course principally concerned with the second question and in virtue of this fact is an autonomous system.

Man, however, also wishes for an answer to the third question and for this a transcendental theology is required:. It is this aspect of aporetic questioning that determines the moral attitude as something sacred. Husserl would reject most of the above on the grounds of its being insufficiently descriptive of the intentive processes of consciousness. For Husserl, we discriminate between, for example, willing and moving because of the different meanings of their objective correlates. Somehow, in a way that is not evident, this description is valid for my fellow man universally.

Perhaps via an argument from analogy or alternatively via the use of imagination to vary cases more or less systematically. It is distinguished from the agreeable as that which influences the will only by means of feeling from merely subjective causes which hold only for the senses of this or that one, and not as a principle of reason which holds for everyone. This view is consistent with that of Aristotle for whom it was important to give as correct a description and explanation of the emotions as possible.

Such are anger, pity, fear, and the like, with their opposites. We must arrange what we have to say about each of them under three heads. Take, for instance, the emotion of anger: here we must discover what the state of mind of angry people is, who the people are with whom they usually get angry, and on what grounds they get angry. It is not enough to know one or two of these points; unless we know all throw, we shall be unable to arouse anger in anyone.

The same is true of the other emotions. It is important also to note here that for Aristotle, a speech has two parts, one in which you state your case, and the other in which you prove your case. Proof can occur via examples of actions or outcomes in the past, or via enthymemes which include maxims of action or judgments.

Rhetoric should not be employed by those who propose and administer laws and justice simply because, as Aristotle claimed:. Next, laws are made after ling consideration whereas decisions in the courts are given at short notice, which makes it hard for those who try the case to satisfy the claims of justice and expediency.


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They will often have allowed themselves to be influenced by feelings of friendship, hatred or self-interest that they lose any clear vision of the truth and have their judgment obscured by considerations of personal pleasure and pain. It is clear from the above that the issue of justice is a universal good-in-itself and not merely an instrumental and particular good.

Dialectical reasoning when it aims at instilling or removing emotional states appears to have an effect similar to music, according to Aristotle, a cathartic effect aiming at what Aristotle termed innocent pleasure: a particular pleasure felt at a particular time aiming at what Kant would have called self-love.

Particular judgments of the above kind aim at feeling good, aim, that is, at instilling a pleasurable state of mind o. The absence of universality indicates here the irrelevance of truth and the absence of law-governed action. The above distinction between a dialectically-based Rhetoric of the kind used by individual lawyers to argue for positions in individual cases and a law-based system of universal judgments in which the evaluation of any action under consideration is deemed either to be following the law or not by a judge is contained in the Philosophy of Kant in the distinction between the logic of particular and universal judgments respectively.

Particular judgments will be related to intuition and its particular immediate effect on the cognitive system of the judger and universal judgments will involve more general conceptual relations, i. Now Husserl would not have been able to give us anything like the above-nuanced accounts of the role of Rhetoric in the formation of judgments. Phenomenology, according to Ricoeur, owes a debt to Hegel.

How to characterize that debt is problematic given the role of dialectical logic in the relativization of both Aristotelian and Kantian categorical deductive logic.